North Dakota Law Review
Volume 13

Number 5

Article 1

1936

The Supreme Court and Abraham Lincoln

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1936) "The Supreme Court and Abraham Lincoln," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 13 : No. 5 , Article 1.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol13/iss5/1

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

BAR BRIEFS
PUBLISHED MONTHLY AT DICKINSON
-By-

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
OF NORTH DAKOTA
M. L. McBride, Editor'
Entered as Second Class Matter Dec. 9, 1936, at the Postoffice at
Dickinson, North Dakota, Under the Act of August 24, 1912.

VOL. 13.

APRIL, 1937.

NO. 5.

THE SUPREME COURT AND ABRAHAM LINCOLN
At the request of the President -of our Association,
I am pinch hitting for him in this number on his page,
and have selected the above title because President
Lincoln's criticism of a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the famous case of Dred Scott
vs. Sanford, has been frequently referred to as indicative that he did not have a high regard for judicial authority in cases where it ran counter to popular will.
In support of this contention reference has been made
to a speech made by Mr. Lincoln at Cincinnati, September 17, 1859. In the speech he said: "The people of
these United States are the rightful masters of both
Congresses and Courts"; and it has been contended
that the words quoted indicate a belief on the part of
Lincoln that the popular will should be held superior
to the decrees and judgments of judicial tribunals.
This view is not, however, supported by the evidence.
No man entertained a higher regard for judicial authority than did Mr. Lincoln. It is beyond dispute that he
severely criticised the judges of the Supreme Court of
the United States who concurred in the majority opinion in the Dred Scott case. He believed it to be the result of the pro-slavery views of Chief Justice Taney
and the associate judges who united with him in the
decision. While he admitted its binding force in the
particular case in which it was rendered, he insisted
that it should not be regarded as a final settlement of
(Continued on Next Page)
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the question involved, and that therefore it should not be followed
as a rule of political action. But our friends who favor President
Roosevelt's proposals did not quote Mr. Lincoln's full statement
in his Cincinnati speech, and the part of the sentence left
out changes his whole meaning. The whole sentence was as follows: "The people of these United States are the rightful masters of both Congress and Courts, NOT TO OVERTHROW THE
CONSTITUTION, but overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution". And in his Springfield speech he defined his position
with reference to the Supreme Court of the United States in the
following language :-"Judicial decisions have two uses - first,
to absolutely determine the case decided; and secondly, to indicate
to the public how other similar cases will be decided when they
arise. For the latter use they are called "precedents" and "authorities". We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more)
in obedience to and respect for the judicial department of the Goernment. We think its decisions on constitutional questions,
when fully settled, should control not only the particular cases decided but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed
only by amendments to the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself. More than this would be revolution."
Mr. Lincoln never said anything from which it can be inferred
that he favored any policy, which would curtail, even in the slightest degree the independence of the judiciary, and in another
speech at Springfield he said: "I think that in respect for judicial
authority my humble history would not suffer in comparison with
that of .Judge Douglas. He would have the citizen conform his
vote to that decision; the member of Congress his;-the President
his use of the veto power. He would make it a rule of political
action for the people and the departments of the government. I
would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of
property, create no disorder, excite no mobs."
Other utterances of Mr. Lincoln's might be cited, which show
that he regarded the independence of the judiciary as of supreme
importance under the American system of Government.
More than seventy-five years ago, DeToqueville, in his "Democracy in America" wrote: "I am aware that a secret tendency
to diminish the judicial power exists in the United States-I venture to predict that these innovations will sooner or later be attended with fatal consequences and that it will be found out at
some future period, that the attack which is made upon the judicial power has affected the democratic republic itself." In recent
years these attacks have become more formidable than ever in
the history of the country and have generally assumed the form
of a demand for the recall of judges by popular vote, but now
President Roosevelt proposes to secure the same result by packing the Court. Nor has it ever been claimed by anyone that Mr.
Lincoln either suggested or approved of any method of compelling
submission by the Judges to the popular will. It seems to me that
his record upon substantially the same subject as that now under
consideration, wherein he strongly condemned the action of the
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Legislature of Illinois, for enacting a law which had the effect of
recalling all of the Circuit Judges of the state, adding five new
judges to the Supreme Court and imposing upon the judges of the
latter court the performance of the duties which had theretofore
been performed by circuit judges can well be cited here. A protest signed by Mr. Lincoln (then a member of the Legislature) and
others was presented to the Legislature, condemning the action of
the majority of that body by whose votes was passed the act
in question, and giving the reasons for this disapprobation, among
which were the following:
It violates the great principles of free government
by subjecting the judiciary to the legislature.
It is a fatal blow at the independence of the judges
and the constitutional term of their office .....
It will give our courts a political and partisan character, thereby impairing public confidence in their decisions.
It will impair our standing with other states and
the world.
It is a party measure for party purposes, from which
no practical good to the people can possibly arise, but
which may be the source of immeasurable evils.
In notes for a speech or debate with Judge Douglas about
October 1st, 1858, in referring to the law adding the five judges
to the Supreme Court of Illinois, he said: "I remind him of a piece
of Illinois history about Supreme Court decisions--of a time when
the Supreme Court of Illinois, consisting of four judges, because of
one decision made, and one expected to be made, were overwhelmed by the adding of five new judges to their number; that he,
Judge Douglas, took a leading part in that onslaught, ending in his
sitting down on the bench as one of the five added judges. I suggest to him that as to his questions how far judges have to be
cathecized in advance, when appointed under such circumstances,
and how far a court, so constituted, is prostituted beneath the contempt of all men, no man is better posted to answer than he-."
These statements, it seems to me, should forever set at rest
any ideas that Mr. Lincoln might have approved of the proposals
now made by President Roosevelt.
THE CONSTITUTION-GUARANTEE OF THE
BILL OF RIGHT
As promised in the last issue I now call to your attention for
consideration, on the President's proposals, the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, and one may wonder whether the guaranties of the Bill of Rights would continue to be "guaranties' 'or
be anything more than mere admonitions or "counsels of perfection", if the Supreme Court, which was designed to be, and
through the century and a half of its existence, has been their
vindicator, should be made subservient to either the President or
the Congress. These guaranties are as follows:

